The Guirella Concept

"Attack where he is unprepared; sally out when he does not expect you."
- Sun Tzu

A fascinating unconventional way of combat is the guerrilla war. The guerrilla actually originated in Spain during the French occupation (1802) and placed a heavy burden on the Napoleonic forces. In the second half of the 20th century it proved to be an effective form of mobile warfare as demonstrated by the victories of Mao Zedong, Tito and Ho Chi Min and his supreme commander General Giap. The guerrilla war is a very effective method for a meagrely armed army being confronted by superior conventional forces. It is imperative that guerrillas be strongly motivated and have the support of the population. This support is vital because it is the powerbase of guerrilla forces.

The most famous guerrilla maxim was formulated by Mao Zedong:

"The enemy advances, we retreat.
The enemy halts, we harass.
The enemy seeks to avoid battle, we attack.
The enemy retreats, we pursue."

The beauty of this maxim is that it concisely formulates the essence of the fluid tactics of guerrilla warfare. Clearly it's a strategy of attrition of long duration. Mao Zedong defined it as "the strategy of the protracted conflict". Elasticity and mobility are essential to avoid quickly an unfavourable action of the enemy, which also means that guerrilla forces must be able to obtain information about the enemy's moves in time. It is the population which provides the necessary intelligence and shelter.

"The guerrilla must move along the people as a fish swims in the sea."
- Mao Zedong

Because of the support of the population the guerrilla wars in China and Vietnam were successful, but the guerrilla warfare of the communist uprising in Malaysia (1950-1960) was a failure because the British succeeded in denying the guerrillas the support of the people. The guerrilla strategy aims at gradually weakening the enemy until in the long run that final moment is reached where superiority has been gained and when one has to engage in the final decisive battle in the conventional way. The problem is the transfer from guerrilla warfare to large-scale positional warfare. Small guerrilla groups are able to eat away at the enemy's strength but cannot conquer large cities or subdue a large, well concentrated conventional army. Regular ground troops are still needed to occupy inhabited territory. This implies that the guerrilla army in the end-phase must be able to transform itself into a conventional force which is able to permanently occupy conquered territory.

Business seems to be quite attracted by the concept of the guerrilla warfare, probably because of its romantic aspects and because subterfuge, surprise, ambushes and stratagems are the order of the day. David versus Goliath! However, guerrilla warfare does not consist of just one action; it is a relentless pattern of small tactical actions. To resort to guerrilla tactics the organization needs to have the stamina to take up a strategic battle of long duration. Well orchestrated conventional flank attacks or encirclement tactics are often much more effective than the protracted strategy of the guerrilla warfare.

Guerrilla warfare is only possible when the company possesses:

1. Well motivated employees;

2. A flexible and creative organization;

3. Good products;

4. Enough stamina;

5. The sympathy of the public.