One of the pioneer proponents of Air Power as a potent force was Guilin Douhet. The fact remains that Douhet had little knowledge of airplanes and perhaps had just flown twice or thrice in his entire life. But he was a visionary who looked far ahead and imagined the use of the airplane as an instrument for a total victory in a modern war. He propounded his theory in 1921 which stated that modern war could be won by airpower alone and the other arms were but ancillary to the air effort. Though Douhet was a farsighted man, yet his theory of victory on airpower alone is suspect. Douhets theory of sustained bombardment in a modern war as a road to victory is correct to a point but not entirely successful. But again it must be stated that no modern war can be won without the use of airpower.
The Second World War was the first place where Douhets theories were put to use. The Luftwaffe started with strategic bombing of England in 1940 which was however abandoned by Goering when it appeared to him that the German Air Force had failed in its objective of forcing the British to surrender. Subsequently the day and night bomber raids over Germany failed by itself to force the surrender of the Nazis. Vietnam is another example when a massive use of airpower with all its aspects failed to bring the Viet Cong to its knees and ultimately could not stop the retreat of the US forces from this theatre. Thus Douhets theory needs a little modification as brought out by Air Chief Marshal Lord Tender and others; that though Air Power is a decisive aspect of a modern war yet it needs the infantry soldier to hold the ground.
Douhet also did not think of air operations in a guerrilla/civil war like in Afghanistan. But the universality of his theory can be seen from the fact that it can be extended to guerrilla and civil wars albeit with a little modification. Over the years I feel that three rules for intervention in such wars need to be borne in mind. Firstly don't intervene in a civil war and secondly if you do, then choose the winning side and lastly ensure that it wins. Hitler picked Gen. Franco in the Spanish Civil War in the thirties and he won. NATO has intervened in the Afghan civil war against the Taliban and has to ensure that the result is not a Pyrrhic victory.
General Colin Powell the former Chief of the US Army during his tenure as Chief of Staff had propounded what is known as the 'Powell Doctrine'. The cornerstone of this is that the United States should enter fights with every bit of force or none at all and secondly intervention by the United States should always be in a place and environment where it can easily extricate itself if it cannot enforce a political solution. This doctrine was an outcome of the American intervention and retreat in Vietnam with a view to prevent such slow burner conflicts from escalating.
But the changing world scenario has forced the United States into an operation in Afghanistan. The Americans and their NATO allies have to put Douhets theories into practice in a scenario not envisaged by Douhet. Afghanistan is a mountainous region landlocked on all sides. The Russians operated there with their helicopter gunships and could not subdue the local Islamic militia.
What then is the solution? Is airpower in Afghanistan redundant? The answer is that Douhet may yet be proved right. For this to succeed a sustained air campaign needs to be launched. Collateral damage will have to be accepted. Again as I have mentioned in earlier articles the key to the war in Afghanistan is India. The US and NATO must incorporate the Indian air force in their strategy. Otherwise fighting in an alien land with all its attendant risks will come to the fore. Systematic air assault mostly by helicopter gunships may well be the answer to the battle against the Islamic militants.Air power has proved decisive in deserts and plains like in Iraq. Where in the first war against Saddam an air assault of 38 days reduced the Iraqi force to jelly and the ground troops could move in easily.
In Afghanistan there may be no pitched battle. Fighting guerillas is a different kettle of fish. But here again the mistakes of Vietnam need to be avoided. At that time a movement in the USA itself 'to bring the boys home' resulted in watered down options against the vet cong.This is to be avoided.
The US and NATO forces have to put the fear of god in the hearts of the fundamentalists who are feeding on a diet of ignorance and blind faith. But all these are of no avail against sustained bombardment from the air as enunciated by Douhet. It has to be 24 hour operation. Ground troops can then only move once the enemy has lost its teeth. The second point covers the saunctries of the Jihadist which are in Pakistan. Kipling wrote that no quarter to be given and none expected in his poems on Afghanistan. As a corollary an operation against the hideouts in Pakistan needs to be mounted from the air. Douhets theory of air superiority and destruction from the air have to be followed.Once the sanctuaries are destroyed and the training camps annihilated the road to success wail not be far.
Douhet only gave a theory. As with all theories there are riders. So a success of the theory of Douhet in Afghanistan will vindicate this military theorist as a man with a vast vision. We cannot forget the Japan was brought down to its knees during World War II, by air power alone and the USAF was the principle component.
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